

STATE OF WISCONSIN Division of Hearings and Appeals

In the	Matter of	
Office	of the Inspector General, Petitioner	
VS.	, Respondent	DECISION Case #: FOF - 173569
decisio	ent to petition filed April 11, 2016, under Wis. Admin on by the Office of the Inspector General to disquates (FS) one year, a hearing was held on Tuesday, May	alify from receiving FoodShare
The iss	sue for determination is whether the respondent comm	itted an Intentional Program Violation (IPV).
There	appeared at that time the following persons:	
	PARTIES IN INTEREST: Petitioner:	
	Office of the Inspector General Department of Health Services - OIG PO Box 309 Madison, WI 53701	
	Respondent:	
	ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Debra Bursinger Division of Hearings and Appeals	
	FINDINGS OF	FFACT
1. 2.	The respondent (CARES # is a residence from September 15, 2014 through Julian September, 2014, the agency issued a FS card household of one. This card was the respondent's 12015.	y 1, 2015.

- 3. On June 5, 2015, the agency received an anonymous tip that the respondent was incarcerated since January, 2015 and had given his FS card to others to use.
- 4. On November 24, 2015, the agency received information from the Sheriff's Department that the respondent was incarcerated from January 30, 2015 June 18, 2015.
- 5. During the period of February 16, 2015 April 11, 2015, the respondent's FS card ending in used in 16 transactions totaling \$387.60.
- 6. On May 18, 2016, the petitioner prepared an Administrative Disqualification Hearing Notice alleging that respondent allowed others not a part of his household to use his FS benefits.

DISCUSSION

An intentional program violation of the FoodShare program occurs when a recipient intentionally does the following:

- 1. makes a false or misleading statement, or misrepresents, conceals or withholds facts; or
- 2. commits any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, the Food Stamp Program Regulations, or any Wisconsin statute for the purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing or trafficking of FoodShare benefits or QUEST cards.

FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook, § 3.14.1; see also 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(c) and Wis. Stat. §§ 946.92(2).

An intentional program violation can be proven by a court order, a diversion agreement entered into with the local district attorney, a waiver of a right to a hearing, or an administrative disqualification hearing, *FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook*, § 3.14.1. The petitioner can disqualify only the individual found to have committed the intentional violation; it cannot disqualify the entire household. Those disqualified on grounds involving the improper transfer of FS benefits are ineligible to participate in the FoodShare program for one year for the first violation, two years for the second violation, and permanently for the third violation. Although other family members cannot be disqualified, their monthly allotments will be reduced unless they agree to make restitution within 30 days of the date that the FS program mails a written demand letter. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b).

In order for the petitioner to establish that an FS recipient has committed an IPV, it has the burden to prove two separate elements by clear and convincing evidence. The recipient must have: 1) committed; and 2) intended to commit a program violation per 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(6). In *Kuehn v. Kuehn*, 11 Wis.2d 15 (1959), the court held that:

Defined in terms of quantity of proof, reasonable certitude or reasonable certainty in ordinary civil cases may be attained by or be based on a mere or fair preponderance of the evidence. Such certainty need not necessarily exclude the probability that the contrary conclusion may be true. In fraud cases it has been stated the preponderance of the evidence should be clear and satisfactory to indicate or sustain a greater degree of certitude. Such degree of certitude has also been defined as being produced by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Such evidence, however, need not eliminate a reasonable doubt that the alternative or opposite conclusion may be true. ...

Kuehn, 11 Wis.2d at 26.

Wisconsin Jury Instruction – Civil 205 is also instructive. It provides:

Clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence is evidence which when weighed against that opposed to it clearly has more convincing power. It is evidence which satisfies and convinces you that "yes" should be the answer because of its greater weight and clear convincing power. "Reasonable certainty" means that you are persuaded based upon a rational consideration of the

evidence. Absolute certainty is not required, but a guess is not enough to meet the burden of proof. This burden of proof is known as the "middle burden." The evidence required to meet this burden of proof must be more convincing than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence but may be less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, the *McCormick* treatise states that "it has been persuasively suggested that [the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof] could be more simply and intelligibly translated to the jury if they were instructed that they must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is highly probable." 2 *McCormick on Evidence* § 340 (John W. Strong gen. ed., 4th ed. 1992.

Thus, in order to find that an IPV was committed, the trier of fact must derive from the evidence a firm conviction as to the existence of each of the two elements even though there may be a reasonable doubt as to their existence.

In order to prove the second element, i.e., intention, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient intended to commit the IPV. The question of intent is generally one to be determined by the trier of fact. *State v. Lossman*, 118 Wis.2d 526 (1984). There is a general rule that a person is presumed to know and intend the probable and natural consequences of his or her own voluntary words or acts. *See, John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck*, 208 Wis. 650 (1932); 31A C.J.S. Evidence §131. Intention is a subjective state of mind to be determined upon all the facts. *Lecus v. American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston*, 81 Wis.2d 183 (1977). Thus, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient knew that the act or omission was a violation of the FS Program but committed the violation anyway.

Based upon the record before me, I find that the petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent intentionally violated FS program rules, and that this violation was the first such violation committed by the respondent. At the hearing, the respondent testified that his identity had been stolen and others were using his identity to get benefits. He testified that he told the jail that his identity had been stolen and asked them to end his FS benefits. The respondent did not produce any evidence regarding a report that his identity had been stolen. Without further evidence, I must conclude that the agency has met its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent allowed others that are not part of his FS household to use his benefits while he was incarcerated. His card could not have been used without respondent giving his PIN to others. Therefore, I conclude the evidence demonstrates that the respondent committed an intentional program violation when he allowed others to use his card while he was incarcerated and the petitioner correctly seeks to disqualify the respondent from the FS program for one year.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- 1. The respondent violated, and intended to violate, the FS program rule specifying that FS benefits must be used for the household.
- 2. The violation specified in Conclusion of Law No. 1 is the first such violation committed by the respondent.

NOW, THEREFORE, it is ORDERED

That the petitioner's determination is sustained, and that the petitioner may make a finding that the respondent committed a first IPV of the FoodShare program and disqualify the respondent from the program for one year, effective the first month following the date of receipt of this decision.

REQUEST FOR A REHEARING ON GROUNDS OF GOOD CAUSE FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR

In instances where the good cause for failure to appear is based upon a showing of non-receipt of the hearing notice, the respondent has 30 days after the date of the written notice of the hearing decision to claim good cause

for failure to appear. See 7 C.F.R. sec. 273.16(e)(4). Such a claim should be made in writing to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 7875, Madison, WI 53707-7875.

APPEAL TO COURT

You may also appeal this decision to Circuit Court in the county where you live. Appeals must be filed with the Court **and** served either personally or by certified mail on the Secretary of the Department of Health Services, 1 West Wilson Street, Room 651, Madison, WI 53703, **and** on those identified in this decision as "PARTIES IN INTEREST" **no more than 30 days after the date of this decision** or 30 days after a denial of a timely rehearing request (if you request one).

The process for Circuit Court Appeals may be found at Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53. A copy of the statutes may be found online or at your local library or courthouse.

Given under my hand at the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 19th day of July, 2016

\sDebra Bursinger Administrative Law Judge Division of Hearings and Appeals

c: Office of the Inspector General - email
Public Assistance Collection Unit - email
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability - email
- email



State of Wisconsin\DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

Brian Hayes, Administrator Suite 201 5005 University Avenue Madison, WI 53705-5400 Telephone: (608) 266-3096 FAX: (608) 264-9885 email: DHAmail@wisconsin.gov Internet: http://dha.state.wi.us

The preceding decision was sent to the following parties on July 19, 2016.

Office of the Inspector General
Public Assistance Collection Unit
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability

@dhs.wisconsin.gov